At the 35th meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group in Brussels on 18 June 2026, Ukrainian and allied officials presented the war against Russia not only as a continuing national defence effort by Ukraine, but as a central problem of European and transatlantic security. The meeting took place at NATO headquarters and brought together Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, newly appointed UK Defence Secretary Dan Jarvis, Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, and representatives of partner states involved in the Ramstein-format coordination mechanism. The central issues were air defence, ballistic-missile interception, drone warfare, extended-range artillery ammunition, unmanned ground systems, long-term financing of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the institutional integration of Ukraine’s battlefield experience into the wider defence planning of NATO and European partners.
Zelenskyy opened his intervention by thanking the defence ministers and military leaders who had supported Ukraine since the early phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion. He noted that the personnel around the table had changed over the years, but that the strategic purpose of the group had remained consistent: to identify practical ways of sustaining Ukraine’s defence and to convert political commitment into operational capacity. In his account, the contact group had already saved lives by enabling the delivery of air-defence systems, munitions, drones, and other military equipment.
The meeting followed the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, France, where Ukraine had again been discussed as a major element of European security and global geopolitical stability. Zelenskyy said that discussions with G7 leaders, including U.S. President Donald Trump, had produced a common position in favour of increasing pressure on Russia to end the war. He presented diplomatic pressure, sanctions, weapons deliveries, and industrial cooperation as parts of a single strategy: Russia, in his view, had to be pushed toward a situation in which negotiation became its only rational option. The meeting in Brussels therefore took place in the immediate aftermath of a broader diplomatic effort and was intended to turn that political consensus into military and industrial measures.
The most urgent problem identified by Zelenskyy was Russia’s continued use of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure, military logistics, and civilian sites. He stated that Ukraine had achieved a high interception rate against drones and had also strengthened its ability to defend against cruise missiles, but he stressed that Russian ballistic missiles remained a more difficult problem. Ballistic missiles are harder to intercept because of their speed, trajectory, and short warning times, and they require specialised systems such as Patriot-class interceptors or comparable anti-ballistic capabilities. Zelenskyy therefore argued that Ukraine and its partners needed to move beyond temporary emergency deliveries and begin constructing a European anti-ballistic architecture capable of protecting Ukraine and, by extension, strengthening Europe’s own defence posture.
In that context, Ukraine and Germany announced a significant step toward joint anti-ballistic development. Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius signed implementation arrangements intended to combine Ukrainian operational experience and technological development with German industrial capacity. The cooperation covered two related areas: the development of anti-ballistic capabilities, including advanced interceptor missiles, and the joint production of Termit unmanned ground vehicles in Germany. The anti-ballistic programme was framed as part of a wider European effort to create a sovereign solution against ballistic missile threats, while the UGV arrangement was intended to supply Ukraine with thousands of robotic ground systems for logistics and battlefield support. Germany was to finance the UGV production, while Ukrainian and German companies were to cooperate on the missile-defence component.
Zelenskyy linked this industrial cooperation to Ukraine’s immediate battlefield needs. He argued that the anti-ballistic coalition had to produce visible results before the coming winter, because Russian missile attacks had repeatedly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian life during colder months. He asked partner states to contribute to the emerging anti-ballistic effort and to accelerate decisions that had already been prepared. His point was not merely that Ukraine needed more interceptors, but that timing itself had strategic value. When Patriot missiles or other air-defence munitions arrived just before a Russian mass strike, he said, they could make the difference between a successful interception and civilian casualties. Delays of even a few days could therefore have measurable human and military consequences.
The discussion also focused on the PURL mechanism, referred to phonetically in the transcript as “Pearl.” PURL, the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, is a NATO-coordinated mechanism through which allies and partners finance packages of U.S.-made weapons and munitions for Ukraine according to Ukraine’s most urgent operational requirements. Zelenskyy thanked Rutte personally for supporting the mechanism and urged countries that were considering new contributions to announce them immediately rather than waiting for the forthcoming NATO summit in Türkiye. He argued that Ukraine faced daily attacks and therefore could not afford to postpone deliveries for diplomatic choreography. In his formulation, weapons that could protect Ukraine immediately should be committed at the Brussels meeting rather than reserved for later political announcements.
Zelenskyy also referred to Russian strikes on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, one of the most important Christian monastic complexes in Eastern Europe. He described attacks on such cultural and religious sites as crimes against humanity and connected them to the broader pattern of Russian strikes against Ukrainian civilian, cultural, and historical infrastructure. He then referred to Ukrainian long-range operations against Russian oil facilities, refineries, and military logistics. In his account, Ukraine’s “long-range sanctions,” meaning military strikes against strategic Russian targets, were already affecting Russia’s fuel supply and federal budget revenues, while medium-range attacks were disrupting Russian military logistics. He presented these strikes as part of Ukraine’s response to Russian attacks and as one element of the pressure required to make continued war more costly for Moscow.
The meeting also reflected the growing centrality of drone warfare. Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine was ready to share its experience more actively with partners and said that the “drone deal” format already involved NATO and non-NATO countries from different regions of the world. He argued that Ukraine was no longer only a recipient of assistance but also a provider of military knowledge, particularly in the areas of reconnaissance, target acquisition, autonomous systems, electronic warfare, and the integration of drones into tactical and operational decision-making. This theme recurred throughout the meeting: Ukraine’s partners repeatedly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces had developed forms of warfare that NATO militaries needed to study and absorb.
Zelenskyy raised two urgent matériel shortages with Rutte: unmanned ground vehicles and long-range artillery ammunition. He said that Ukraine did not have enough of either, that European production remained insufficient, and that funding levels did not yet match the scale of the requirement. Extended-range 155 mm ammunition remained particularly important because artillery continued to shape the attritional contest along the front line, while unmanned ground vehicles could reduce risks to soldiers by moving supplies, ammunition, and equipment across exposed areas. Zelenskyy argued that increasing the production and delivery of these systems would help Ukraine impose higher costs on Russian attacks and preserve its own combat power.
In the same address, Zelenskyy said that Russia was paying for the continuation of the war with at least 30,000 soldiers killed or seriously wounded every month at the front. This figure was presented as part of Ukraine’s argument that Russian offensive operations were costly and that sustained Western support could further raise the price of aggression. He also argued that the Ukrainian army had become the principal force in Europe capable of deterring and resisting large-scale land aggression over a prolonged period. On that basis, he asked allies to begin planning not only for Ukraine’s immediate survival, but for the long-term financing of the Ukrainian armed forces after the war. In his view, a strong Ukrainian army would remain an essential component of Europe’s future security architecture and would help deter any renewed Russian aggression.
Zelenskyy thanked the European Union for its €90 billion support loan for Ukraine, a package intended to help finance urgent budgetary and defence needs over 2026 and 2027. He also thanked individual states for bilateral support but urged them to create longer-term financial instruments capable of sustaining Ukraine’s armed forces for years. His argument was that European defence could not be separated from Ukrainian military capacity. If Europe wanted the strongest possible conventional deterrent against Russia, he said, it would need to cooperate with Ukraine structurally rather than episodically. The implication was that Ukraine’s army, defence industry, drone ecosystem, and accumulated battlefield knowledge should be treated as permanent components of European security rather than as temporary wartime assets.
Boris Pistorius followed by emphasizing that Germany’s support for Ukraine would continue and that the UDCG had played an instrumental role in enabling Ukraine’s battlefield resilience. He said that Russia’s offensive was faltering while Ukrainian forces were maintaining momentum, and he described Ukraine’s ability to carry the war back to Russian military and energy infrastructure as strategically significant. Pistorius connected this battlefield momentum to allied support, arguing that assistance provided through the contact group had helped Ukraine build capabilities in drones, mid-range strike systems, reconnaissance, and digitally accelerated target acquisition. He described his own recent visit to Ukrainian command posts near Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro, where he had observed Ukrainian operational methods and been impressed by the professionalism and innovation of Ukrainian soldiers.
Pistorius placed special emphasis on the fact that the relationship between Ukraine and its partners was no longer a one-way channel of aid. Ukraine, he argued, had become a source of military learning for Europe. Its use of unmanned systems, drone assault formations, data-based targeting, and rapid adaptation under battlefield pressure offered lessons that would influence future warfare. Germany’s agreement with Ukraine on anti-ballistic systems was therefore not only an act of assistance but also a form of mutual strategic investment. Pistorius said that several German companies were interested in participating if industrial arrangements could be concluded, and he framed the project as a contribution to both Ukrainian and European security.
The German defence minister also described the political situation facing Moscow as increasingly constrained. He argued that Russia’s illegal attack on Ukraine had produced enormous losses among Russian troops and that the domestic consequences of the war were becoming harder for the Kremlin to conceal. At the same time, he accused Russia of choosing escalation over negotiation despite Ukrainian attempts to revive stalled diplomatic efforts. He interpreted Russian military pressure against Ukraine and provocations along NATO’s eastern flank as attempts to distract from battlefield failures. For that reason, he said, allies should not allow Russian escalation to divert them from continued support for Ukraine. The conclusion he drew was that Ukraine’s momentum could be maintained only if partners coordinated their resources more effectively.
Dan Jarvis, speaking as the newly appointed UK Defence Secretary, reaffirmed continuity in British policy despite the change in leadership at the Ministry of Defence. He paid tribute to his predecessor John Healey, who had co-led the UDCG with Pistorius during a period of intensified Russian attacks, and stated that the United Kingdom would stand with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” Jarvis presented the group’s task in practical terms: Ukraine had to remain strong enough to defend itself against Russian attacks, hold the front line, and secure a just and durable peace. He then listed Ukraine’s priority requirements as air-defence systems, 155 mm extended-range ammunition, and Ukrainian-made drones.
Jarvis used the meeting to announce a major UK package. The United Kingdom committed to supplying 150,000 Ukrainian-produced drones, more than 350 air-defence missiles, and radar systems by the end of 2026 as part of a £752 million military support package. The package was funded through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan mechanism, backed by proceeds from immobilised Russian sovereign assets. Jarvis also said that the UDCG members were being asked to finance two PURL packages, 200,000 rounds of extended-range 155 mm ammunition, 100 critical Patriot missiles through the JUMPSTART mechanism, and one million Ukrainian drones. These figures reflected the scale of Ukraine’s continuing requirements and the degree to which the war had become a contest of industrial throughput as well as battlefield tactics.
Rutte’s remarks reinforced the same central message: Ukraine had created battlefield momentum, but that momentum required immediate and predictable allied support. He said that Ukraine had repeatedly demonstrated that it was not only receiving help but also contributing to the security of others by sharing experience and capabilities. He emphasized that political statements about the importance of an independent Ukraine had to be backed by concrete military and practical support. Rutte urged participating states to align their donations with Ukraine’s three top priorities: air defence, Ukrainian drones, and extended-range ammunition. He also called for more equitable burden-sharing among allies, particularly ahead of the NATO summit in Türkiye.
The UDCG meeting therefore had two simultaneous functions. At the operational level, it sought to secure immediate support for Ukraine’s most urgent battlefield needs: interceptors, Patriot missiles, drones, artillery ammunition, UGVs, radar systems, and air-defence missiles. At the strategic level, it marked another stage in the transformation of Ukraine’s role within European security. Ukraine was presented not merely as a state defending itself, but as a military actor whose experience, industry, and army had become essential to Europe’s future deterrence posture. The repeated emphasis on anti-ballistic defence, drone production, and long-term financing indicated that allies were thinking beyond short-term emergency aid and toward a more integrated defence-industrial relationship.
The meeting also showed how the war had altered the relationship between European defence and American military-industrial capacity. PURL and JUMPSTART were mechanisms designed to allow European and partner funding to procure or accelerate U.S.-origin equipment for Ukraine, especially scarce high-end systems such as air-defence interceptors. At the same time, the Ukraine-Germany arrangements and the UK-financed Ukrainian drone package reflected a parallel movement toward European and Ukrainian production. The emerging model was therefore hybrid: Ukraine still needed U.S.-origin systems, especially for air and missile defence, but its partners were also trying to build a more autonomous European-Ukrainian industrial base able to produce drones, interceptors, robotic ground systems, ammunition, and other critical equipment at scale.
By the end of the open session, the speakers had converged on a shared diagnosis. Russia’s war continued, Russian missile and drone attacks remained a daily threat, and Ukraine’s defence depended on the speed, scale, and predictability of allied support. At the same time, Ukraine had developed capabilities that its partners increasingly regarded as indispensable to future European defence. The Brussels meeting therefore functioned as both a pledging conference and a strategic planning session. Its immediate purpose was to fill urgent gaps in air defence, drones, ammunition, and ground robotics; its broader significance lay in the recognition that Ukraine’s defence industry, combat experience, and army were becoming structurally embedded in the security architecture of Europe.
Simon Gros 
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